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IN THE S.UPREME. COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

jiARIE C. CLAUSSE, Administratrix of the Estate of LEON L.
CLAUSSE, Deceased,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, a corporation, FIR'ST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, a corporation, and AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANC·E COMpANY, a corporation,
D·efenda.nts and Respondents.

Case No.
7930

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

The p·arties are referred to herein as follows: Marie
C. Clausse, administratrix of the Estate of Leon L.
Clausse, deceased, as a.p·pellant; First Security Bank of
Utah, as the Bank; and American National Insurance
Company, as the Insurance Company.
This is an appeal fro1n an order of the trial court
granting a non-suit as to both respondents at the con-
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elusion of the appellant's case, without submitting the
matter to a jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is -an action on an oral contract entered into by
Leon L. Clausse, deceased, with the respondents. The
details of the contract are as follows: Mr. and Mrs.
Leon L. Clausse, on or about the 18th day of December,
1948, mortgaged their home in Ogden, Utah, for $2,500.00
with the respondent bank. Mr. S. T. Jeppesen and Mr.
Carl Porter represented the bank in this transaction.
After having app-roved the said loan, l\1:r. Jeppesen and
Mr. Porter, both Vice-Presidents of the said bank, proposed to Mr. Clausse that he insure the mortgage under
"The First Security Mortgage Cancellation Plan," and
explained to him that by contracting with the respondent
bank for said plan, his mortgage would be insured so that
in case of his death it would be paid off and cancelled.
Mr. Clausse accepted their offer and agreed to insure
said mortgage under the plan for $2,000.00 and also
agreed that the mortgage· insurance premiums should
be added by the respondent bank to his monthly mortgage
installments, the first of which was to be paid on February 1, 1949 at the bank. Mr. Clausse was informed
at said time by Mr. Jeppesen that his mortgage protection would begin when the note and mortgage were
signed and would continue throughout the life of the
mortgage. Mr. Clausse agreed to make written application for insurance through a representative to be sent
to his home by the bank, and was later advised by letter

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
dated December 27, 1948, that said representative would
call to explain the ~lortgage Cancellation Plan which
had been worked out by the bank with the respondent
Insurance Cn1npany, and "which at a very nominal cost,
will guarantee the payment of your mortgage for you
in case of your death * * * ." (Plaintiff's Ex. "C").
On January 5, 1949, 1VIr. Reynolds Blackington, local
representative of the respondent Insurance Company,
called on Mr. Clausse at his home, ·stated that he had
been sent there by Mr. Jeppesen to go over the mortgage
insurance plan (Tr. p. 30). He took Mr. Clausse's·application for $2,000.00 of insurance on his life, made the
defendant bank the beneficiary, and informed Mr. Clausse
that the n1ortgage insurance was in effect then (Tr. ppo
36, 96). He also stated that the premiums should be paid
monthly at the respondent bank as arranged with Mr.
Jeppesen. On the next day, Mr. Clausse was examined
by the Insurance Company doctor who told him that he
had passed. No policy was ever delivered to Mr. Clausse.
On January 24, 1949, Mr. Clausse suddenly died from a
heart attack, before the first premium on the mortgage
insurance was due. Both the respondent bank and Insurance Con1pany refused to pay off the mortgage as agreed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The plaintiff makes the following Assignments of
Error.
A.

As to Respondent Bank.
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The Trial Court erred:
1. In granting the Respondent Bank's motion for a
non-suit on the ground that there were not sufficient facts
to· warrant the cause being submitted to a jury, because;
a. Appellant's evidence regarding an oral contract between Leon L. Clausse and the Respondent
Bank should not have been stricken by the trial court.
b. The stricken evidence states sufficient facts
concerning said oral agreement to be· submitted to the
JUry.

B.

As to the Respondent Insurance Company.

The Trial C·ourt erred :
1. In granting the R,espondent Insurance Coinpany's motion for a non-suit on the ground that there was
not sufficient facts to warrant the cause being submitted
to a jury, because;
a. Appellant's .evidence regarding an oral contract between Leon L. Clausse and the Respondent
Insurance Company should not have been stricken
by the trial court.
b. The stricken evidence states sufficient facts
concerning said oral agreement to be submitted to the
JUry.
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ARGUMENT
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE REGARDING AN ORAL
CONTRACT BETWEEN LEON L. CLAUSSE AND THE RESPONDENT BANK SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRICKEN
BY THE TRIAL COURT.

Though the Court below did not state the grounds
upon which it found that there were not sufficient facts
to warrant the cause being submitted to a jury, it seems
clear that it based its said. ruling on the proposition that
the testimony of the plaintiff and of Roscoe Clausse
should be stricken on the grounds presented by the bank.
Consequently the legality of the non-suit is contingent
upon the correctness of the Courts ruling on the bank's
motion to strike the testimony of said two witnesses.
The appellant will, therefore, first discuss said motion.
The bank's motion to strike the testimony of the
plaintiff and of Roscoe Clausse was based "upon the
ground that there is no evidence that either S. T. Jeppesen or Carl Porter or J. D. Madson, or either of them,
had authority to bind this defendant bank in any enforceable oral contract as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and
that if any such agreement was made, the agreement
would be unenforceable against this bank unless they had
authority to bind the bank." (Tr. P. 71, L. 6 to 13)
The motion to strike all of the testimony concerning
the statements 1nade by Reynolds Blackington with respect to said agreement was based upon the ground that
"there is no evidence in this case that Blackington had any
authority of any kind whatsoever to bind the defendant,
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the First Security Bank, and that any declarations made
by him would be purely hearsay statements made without any authority whatsoever." (Tr. P. 70, L. 24-30)
On this point the law is very clear that the plaintiff
had no burden to prove that either of said bank officials
or representatives had authority to bind the bank. The
real question is not whether they had such actual authority but whether the GOntract they n1ade with the deceased
on behalf of the bank was within the apparent scope of
their authority as officers and representatives of the
bank. Story on Agency P. 126, Par. 114 writes:
"It may be stated as a general proposition
that the officers of a bank are held out to the public as having authority to act according to the
general usage, practice, and course of business
of such institutions, and that their acts, within
the scope of such usage, practice, and course of
business, bind the bank in favor of third persons,
having no knowledge to the contrary."

7 Am. J ur. 161 Par. 225:
"When a bank opens its doors for business
with the public and places officers in charge, persons dealing with them in good faith, and without
any notice of any want of authority, will be protected where an act is performed in the apparent
scope of the officers authority, whether the officer
is actually clothed with such authority or not."
In Union Savings & Trust Co. vs. Krumm, 152 Pac.
681 on P. 684 the court states the rule as follows:
.
"The real question is, were the acts done withIn the apparent scope of his authority in view of
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.,
all of the circun1stances or n1ore correctly speaking, u·as the et·idence capable of justifiable inferences suff·ic-i.ent to take the question to the jury?
rrhe rule is \Vell settled that persons dealing ,v}th
corporate agencies have the right to rely upon the
apparent authority of those in charge of the corporate business, and for acts done within the scope
of such apparent authority the corporation is
bound."
Bank of An1erica et al vs. Slotcky confirms the doctrine that
""As an executive officer of the bank he is presmned to have acted within the scope of his authority until a showing is made to the contrary."
The Utah Supreme Court uphold this principle in the
following language:
'~It

is a general principle of the law of agency,
running through all contracts made by agents with
third parties, that the principals are bound by the
acts of their agents which fall within the apparent
scope of the authority of the agents, who have
dealt with these agents in good faith. That general
principle of agency is universally recognized and
applied by the courts, and is laid down by every
text-writer who has written on the subject of
agency." Harrison vs. Auto Security Co., 70 Utah
11, 257 Pac. 677.
So also did the Supreine Court of Utah accept this
rule of ''Indicia of Authority" in Jones vs. Commercial
Investment Trust Co., 64 Utah 139, wherein the court .
quoted froin Glass vs. Cont. Guarentee C·orp., 88 So. 876
(28 A.L.R. 312) as follo,vs:
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"But,where an owner consigns personal·property to a dealer in such goo~s with expr~ss or implied authority to sell or del1ver or consign to another personal property with indicia of ownership,
or authority to sell b~t with title reserved in the
owner until the payment of the purchase price, a
purchaser who pays. value for such goods and gets
possession thereof without notice of the ter1ns and
conditions of the original delivery, consign1nent or
sale, obtains a good title as against the original
owner, which will in general, prevail against the
latters reserved title."
This rule is well stated in 13 Am. Juris. 870, Par. 890
as follows:
"It is a fundamental and well settled rule that
when, in the usual course of the business of a
corporation, an officer or other agent is held out
by the corporation or has been permitted to act
for it or manage its affairs in such a way as to
justify third persons who deal with him in inferring or assu1ning that he is doing an act or making
a contract within the scope of his authority, the
corporation is bound thereby, even though such
officer or agent has not the actual authority from
the corporation to do such an act or make such a
·
con tract."
The real question in the instant case is not, therefore,
as the bank contended, whether the said officers and
agents of the bank actually had authority to make the
contract in question with Mr. Clausse. The appellant had
no burden to prove such authority. The vital point is
whether said' officers and agents of the bank acted in such
a way as to justify Mr. Clausse, W'ko dealt with them,
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in believing or ass~tming that they were making a contract w·ithin the scope of their authority as agents of said
corporatio'n. The determination of this fact was a matter
for the jury, and not the court, to decide.
Let us no"\v apply the above rule of law to the facts
of this case. The evidence shows that Mr. S. T. Jeppesen
and 1\fr. Carl Porter were both Vice Presidents of the
Bank, and that Mr. J. D. Madsen was Assistant Vice
President. Mr. Jeppesen was in charge of real estate
loans for the bank. All three of said officers had offices
in said bank. Mrs. Clausse went into the place of business
of the bank and applied for a loan on the Clausse home to
:Thfr. Jeppesen and, as a result of her application, the two
said vice presidents went to sai,d home and appraised it on
behalf of the Bank for a loan. After having approved
a loan for $2,500 on said home, and while they were still
on the premises of the deceased, they handed Mr. Clausse
a printed pamphlet relating to a Mortgage Cancellation
Plan. (Ptf's Ex. A) The said pamphlet referred to said
plan as "The First ·security Mortgage Cancellation Plan".
The deceased was urged .by said bank officers to insure
his mortgage under said plan. When Mr. Clausse agreed
to do so, arrangements were made by said officials for
him to pay the premiums on said mortgage insurance to
the bank with the installments of his mortgage. On the
day that the note and mortgage were signed by Mrs.
Clausse in Mr. Jeppesen's office in the bank, he informed
her that Mr. Clausse had "authorized him to go ahead
with the insurance," and that he would send an agent
out to her home to write up a policy. (Tr. P. 25, L. 16 to
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21) Subsequently on December 27, 1953 ~Ir. J. D. ~fad
sen Assistance Vice President of the Bank sent to Mr.
'
Clausse
what appears to be a for1n letter in which he advised Mr. Clausse that "In line with the policy of many
loan companies who recognize this fact, we have worked
out with the American National Insurance Co1npany a
plan, which at a very nominal cost, will guarantee the
payment of your mortgage for you in case of your death."
He then wrote that he was asking Reynolds Blackington,
local representative of the said Insurance Company, to
call and explain the plan, and assured him that, "You 1nay
listen to his explanation without feeling that he is there
to sell you additional life insurance, but rather to explain
to you a plan W'hich we believe is very desirable." (Ptf's
Ex. Band C)
Certainly under such circumstances, the deceased was
justified in believing that the officers were acting within
the scope of their authority from the bank and were representing the bank when they presented hiln with a pamphlet described as "The First Security Mortgage Cancellation Plan" and urged him to insure his 1nortgage
under it. The arrangements 1nade with said bank officers
to add the insurance installments to the mortgage installments together with the assurance in the letter written b~·
Mr. Madsen, Asst. Vice President of the Bank, that the
plan was one that had been worked out between the two
respondents and was not a life insurance plan, was additional assurance to Mr. Clausse that all of the officers
and agents who contacted hi1n relating to it were acting
for said bank.
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According to the testin1ony of Mrs. Clausse and
Roscoe Clausse, Mr. Blackington told the deceased that
he had been sent by the Bank officers, and confirmed the
state1nent of said bank officers that the premiums were
to be paid at the bank each month beginning February 1,
1949, and that the mortgage insurance was at that time in
effect. The application for life insurance made the Bank
the beneficiary, which fact alone was justification for the
deceased to conclude that the insurance he was at that
time applying for 'vas a part of "the plan" and was for
the protection of the bank in case of his death. He was,
furthermore, justified in assuming that the said Insurance Company agent was representing both the bank and
the Insurance Company from what ·he said and did on
that occasion.
Certainly the facts of the case warranted the Inatter
being submitted to the jury for the purpose of deterInining whether the deceased was justified in believing
and assuming that those who contacted him with resp·ect
to the Mortgage insurance plan were representing the
Bank and were acting within the apparent scope of their
authority from the Bank, and that he was contracting
for mortgage insurance and not life insurance, as the
Bank contended.
THE STRICKEN EVIDENCE STATES SUFFICIENT
FACTS CONCERNING SAID ORAL AGREEMENT TO BE
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
'!'~he

evidence relating to the oral contract regarding
the F:irst Security Mortgage Cancellation Plan which
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was entered into between Leon L. Clausse, deceased, and
the two respondents was presented by the plaintiff and
Roscoe Clausse. Their testimony was stricken by the
court on motion of the respondents in so far as it applied
to them. The testimony of those two witnesses definitely
stated that an offer of mortgage insurance ha:d been made
by Mr. S. T. J eppeson and Carl Porter, both Vice Presidents of the Respondent Bank, to the deceased, and that
it was acceptable by him. The consideration- monthly
premiums to be paid by the deceased to the bank- had
been agreed upon and the deceased had authorized
the bank to add the insurance premiums to his monthly
payments on his note and mortgage, in return for which
the bank agreed to cancel the mortgage in case of his
death. The testimony was definite that the insurance
took effe'Ct on the signing of the note and mortgage. Both
the deceased and the bank were competent to enter into
such a contract, and the oral agreement was supported
by written proof. (Ptf's Exs. A, B & C)
This court has repeatedly held that in considering
a motion to dismiss or a non-suit for insufficiency of the
evidence, as in the instant case, "all of the plaintiff's evidence together with all legitimate inferences that can be
deducted therefrom must be conceded to be true. For
the purposes of the motion, the defendant admits every
inference deducible from any facts that were proved."
In such matters it is the duty of the court "to consider
facts well pleaded and admitted as true, and to give plaintiff the benefit of every legitimate inference and intentment which may fairly and legitimately arise fron1 the
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evidence." Kitchen vs. Kitchen, 83 U t. 370, 28 Pac. 2nd
180; Smith vs. Columbus Buggy Co., 40 Ut. 580, 123 P.
580; Dunn vs. Salt Lake & 0. R. Co., 47 Ut. 137, 151 P.
979.
If the testimony of the plaintiff and of Roscoe
Clausse is permitted to stand by this court, it is apparent
from the record that there is ample evidence of an oral
contract between Leon L. Clausse and the two respondents to be submitted to the jury.
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE REGARDING AN ORAL
CONTRACT BETWEEN LEON L. CLAUSSE, DECEASED,
AND THE RESPONDENT INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN STRICKEN BY THE COURT.

The insurance company motion to strike the testimony of the plaintiff and of R.oscoe Clausse p·ertaining
to any conversations between the deceased and their
agent, Reynolds Blackington, was made "On the ground
that it tends to vary the terms of a written instrument,
·and that no evidence has been introduced to show the
authority of Mr. Blackington to alter or amend the contract evidenced by the written application. I further
move to strike the testimony of Mrs. Clausse, any conversations between her and her husband and representatives of the First Security Bank of Utah, on the ground
that such testimony is hearsay as to the American National Insurance C·ompany in this state, that there is no
evidence to indicate that any officers of the First Security
Bank had authority to speak on behalf of the Insurance
Comp·any." (Tr. P. 68 L. 24 to L. 7 P. 69)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

Its motion for a directed verdict was made "on the
ground and for the reason that plaintiff has failed to
show or establish any contract between the defendant
insurance company and plaintiff's decedent, plaintiff's
deceased husband; that plaintiff ha.s failed to show any
authority on behalf of Reynolds Blackington, or any of
the officers of the First Security Bank of Utah, to make a
contract on behalf of the American National Insurance
Company other than the written application exhibit "1",
which expressly states on its face that the liability of the
· company may be had, only by, only in accordance with
the terms of such application, and that no officer, no
agent of the Insurance Company has authority to vary
the terms." (Tr. P. 69 L. 13-24)
At no time has the appellant introduced evidence
which tends to vary the terms of the written application
of the deceased_ for life insurance. She admits that
the application was made and does not dispute any part
of it. This is not a suit on said application for life insurance, and the appellant contends that the making of it
to the respondent Insurance Company wherein the Respondent Bank was the beneficiary, was one of the things
which had to be done by the deceased in order that he
might receive protection on his mortgage under the
Mortgage Cancellation Plan which he was informed had
been worked out between the Respondent Bank and the
Respondent Insurance Co. ( Ptf's Exhibit "C"). The
evidence indicates that said requirement was a part of
an arrangement between the two said respondents for
their mutual benefit. In fact the bank's letter of Decem·
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ber 27, 1948 to the deceased specifically states that what
~fr. Blackington-the Insurance Company's Agent-was
to present to the deceased \vas Hnot to sell you additional
life insurance, but rather to explain to you a plan, etc."
The plan which was explained to the deceased by said
agent was the same one which Mr. Jeppesen and Mr.
Porter of the bank had previously explained: one of
mortgage insurance, which he said was then in effect.
The evidence clearly indicates that his making of the
application for insurance and the subsequent taking of a
physical exa1nination, were done for the benefit of the
two respondents and not for the deceased. He was merely doing what he was required to do under his Mortgage
Cancellation Agreement. He had no direct interest 1n
the Life Insurance Policy, except what might have accrued to him from it under the Cancellation agreement if
he had lived to pay off the mortgage. Consequently the
testimony objected to in no way tendered to vary the
terms of the said application.
The second motion made by the Insurance Company was based on the proposition that appellant showed
no authority for Mr. Blackington or the said officers
of the First ·security Bank to make an oral contract on
behalf of the Insurance Company.
The rule of law relating to the apparent authority
of corporation officers was discussed above in this brief.
The sa1ne rule applies to the agents of insurance companies, as clearly stated in Payne vs. New York Life Ins.
Co., 23 .P. (2d) 6, as follows after the court had stated

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

that it was acquainted with the limitation of authority
of soliciting agents to bind the Company:
"There is another rule which should not be
overlooked. It must be borne in mind, when considering the general rule quoted above. As in the
case of agencies in general, an insurance company is bound by all acts, contracts, or representations of its agents, whether general or special,
which are within his real or apparent authority,
notwithstanding they are in violation of private
instructions or limitations upon his authority, of
which the person dealing with him, acting in good
faith, has neither actual or constructive knowledge."
In holding that an insurer was liable for soliciting
agents' conduct within the apparent scope of his authority in the absence of- evidence that the one relying
thereon knew of the agent's limitations, the Court said
-in the case of Contirnental Ca.sualty Co. vs. Lin.n, 226 Ky.
328, 10 S.W. (2d) 1079, on p. 1081:
"Soliciting agents are entrusted with power
to obtain business for the co1npanies they represent and the consequent profits of the con1panies
are obtained by thern. An insurance agent represents his company and stands in its place in hi~
community. Ordinarily, he is the only person the
policy holder knows and deals with in his transactions with the insurer. He is dealt with on the
faith of his authority to do those things which
he clain1s and has the ostensible right to do."
It is universally held that the question whether an
agent had such ostensible authority is a question for the
jury.
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The facts of this case 'vith respent to the Insurance
Con1pany are of such a nature as to raise a strong inference that both Mr. Blackington and the officers of the
First Security Bank were representing both of the respondents in their dealings with Mr. Clausse relating to
the Mortgage Cancellation Plan. The bank sent Mr.
Blackington to the deceased. He presented the same information to the deceased regarding the plan as the bank
officials had done. The bank declared in writing that the
)Iortgage Cancellation Plan had been worked out between the two respondents. This was not denied by the
insurance company agent. The making of the bank the
beneficiary in the life insurance application and the instructions to pay the premiums to the bank each point
to the fact that the mortgage insurance project was a
joint one of the respondents.
The insurance application was made out on January
5, 1949 and was in the possession of the Insurance Company for a period of 19 days before the death of the
applicant. If the mortgage plan was not a joint one as
it was stated to be in the bank's letter to the deceased,
- then the Insurance C-ompany had plenty of time in which
to inquire into the reason why it was to receive its
pre1niu1ns from the bank, and why the bank was sending
-· the Insurance Company's agent to its customers, and to
.. advise the deceased as to the true facts concerning its
connection with the Mortgage Insurance Plan. The fact
·. that it did nothing of the sort, certainly gave the deceased
plenty of. reason to believe that the agent of the Insur-
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ance Company and the officers of the bank were representing both of the respondents.
It is inconceivable that a large and reputable bank
like the First Security Bank of Utah, would make the
representations it did through its officers and in a printed
pamphlet ( Ptf' s Ex. "A") and by letter to the deceased
(Ptf's E_xs. "B" and "C") and send an insurance company
agent to its customers without having worked out a joint
program with th_e Insurance Company, particularly in
view. of the fact that insurance companies lend money
on real property in competition with banks. So likewise
is it inconceivable that the insurance company's agent
could carry on as Mr. Blackington did in the instant case
without the company knowing what representations were
being made by him to the bank's customers. Sound
reason based upon the facts of this case says that the
Mortgage Cancellation Plan as presented to the deceased
by the representatives of both the bank and the insurance
comp·any was a joint one as it was represented to the
deceased as being, and that Blackington, Jeppesen, Porter, and Madsen ostensibly represented both respondents
as to it. Certainly there was sufficient evidence that such
was the case to be submitted to the jury, particularly in
light of the following statement of the Court in the case
of Dunn vs. S.L. db 0. Ry. Co., 151 P. 979, on p. 981:
"Nor: is it ~ate rial whether the evidence upon
the qu~stion - IS strong or weak. By interposing
a motion for a non-suit the defendant not onlv
admitted every fact directly proved but likewise
admitted every inference deducibie from any
facts that were proved."
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THE STRICKEN EVIDENCE STATES SUFFICIENT
FACTS TO CONSTITUTE A BINDING ORAL CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE DECEASED AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY.

Just as the stricken testimony of the plaintiff and
Roscoe Clausse presented the elements of a binding oral
agreement between the deceased and the bank, so did it
prove a verbal agree1nent between the Insurance Company and the deceased, which should have been s.ubmitted to the jury, as has been pointed out before in this.
brief.

·From the law and the facts discussed herein the
appellant respectfully contends that the trial court erred
in granting a non-suit and in refusing to s.ubmit to the
jury the appellant's evidence concerning an oral agreement on a Mortgage Cancellation Plan between the deceased, Leon L. Clausse, and the two respondents. Appellant prays that the order of the lower court be set aside
and that this court grant a new trial on the grounds
discussed herein, and that she have costs.
Respectfully submitted,
IIERBERT B. MAW,
Attorney for App-ellant.
214 Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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